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Cultural modelsAbstract When the global moratorium on commercial whaling was implemented in 1986, Korea
prohibited whaling; however, there was no effort to build the capacity of social institutions to guide
local residents to cooperate with the policy. Utilizing a social ecology approach, this research exam-
ines the practice of eating whale meat in Ulsan, South Korea, to illustrate the importance of culture
for attaining the social acceptance of wildlife conservation policy. The cultural models which inﬂu-
ence the consumption of whale meat are here classiﬁed as representing four distinct responses to the
moratorium: opposition, resistance, evasion and support. The two most important changes are the
public utilization of whale meat as a symbol of an endangered culture, and the reliance on meat
procured legally from accidental entanglements of whales in ﬁshing nets (cetacean bycatch). These
cultural changes have a social function, which is to impart legitimacy and acceptance to the contin-
ued consumption of whale meat, from illegal as well as legal sources. Given the cultural acceptance
of whale meat, I argue that it will not be possible to eradicate the illegal market through enforce-
ment alone. Instead, the solution is to persuade local consumers of whale meat to cooperate with
the moratorium.
ª 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Institution for Marine and Island Cultures,
Mokpo National University.Introduction
Since 1986, it has been illegal to hunt whales, porpoises or dol-
phins in South Korea. However, the Korean delegates at the
64th meeting of the International Whaling Commission
[IWC] caused an international uproar when they announced
Korea’s plans to hunt North Paciﬁc minke whales [Balaenop-
tera acutorostrata] for scientiﬁc purposes. After diplomaticprotests from other governments, South Korea backed away
from the initial statement and cancelled the program of
research whaling (Oh, 2012). Opponents of whaling saw it as
a victory for whale conservation, and announced that the
international moratorium on commercial whaling in effect
since 1986 would continue protecting whales in Korea.
However, because of increasing demand for whale meat
and high incidence of illegal whaling, the moratorium has
failed to protect whales in Korea. In January of 2011, South
Korea announced a tougher policy to combat whaling (BBC
News, 2011). In spite of the tougher enforcement measures,
in 2011 South Korea had the highest incidence of illegalversity.
Fig. 1 Map of Korean cities where whale meat is eaten.
Courtesy of D.K. Yoon, UNIST School of Urban and Environ-
mental Engineering, using ArcGIS.
90 B. Tatarwhaling in the world, with 22 Korean citizens receiving prison
sentences and ﬁnes for 21 cases of whaling discovered by police
(Yonhap News, 2012). Furthermore, Korea has a high inci-
dence of accidental whale deaths caused by entanglements in
ﬁshing nets. For the years 2004–2011, 89 minke whales on
average die annually in net entanglements. Known as ‘‘inciden-
tal catch’’ or ‘‘bycatch,’’ these whales can be sold legally in
Korea for human consumption. Both illegal whaling and
incidental catch continue to feed Korea’s growing demand
for whale meat.
Bycatch has been the cause of intense debate between the
opponents of whaling and the proponents of whale meat.
Environmentalist groups such as KFEM [Korean Federation
of Environmental Movements] and Greenpeace have argued
that in most cases, the accidental entanglements of whales in
ﬁshing nets are not in fact accidental (Black, 2005; Demick,
2005). They claim that Korea’s high rate of minke whale
bycatch compared to other countries cannot be coincidental,
and must surely indicate a disguised form of whaling. In con-
trast, Korean ﬁshermen have argued that the unusually high
rate of bycatch is an indicator that as a result of the morato-
rium, whales have reproduced to the point of extreme over-
abundance. For the ﬁshers, frequent bycatch is a sign that
whale and dolphin populations need to be thinned artiﬁcially
through hunting (SBS News, 2012). In an attempt to correct
this misperception, scientists of the Cetacean Research
Institute [CRI] of Korea have clariﬁed that there is no direct
relationship between the size of the minke whale population
and the incidence of bycatch (SBS News, 2012).
In this article, I maintain that the debate about Korea’s
high level of bycatch is not merely a conﬂict of opinion, such
as could be resolved by scientiﬁc evidence. Rather, it is a clash
of opposed cultural interpretations, in the sense of ‘‘models of
and for reality’’ (Geertz, 1977). Anthropologists have utilized
the concept of ‘‘cultural model’’ to refer to knowledge about
the environment, knowledge which is structured by social
organization and which has visible inﬂuence on discourses
and behaviors at the community level (Blount and Kitner
2007; Paolisso and Dery, 2010). Culturally motivated behav-
iors can pose major problems for conservation of biological
species and natural resources. This is the case of the morato-
rium on commercial whaling in Korea, where reactions to
the moratorium have undermined the efforts to protect whales
from human predation. Based on this case study, I advance the
argument that a successful policy to protect whales from
human predation must take full account of the local culture.
Why do Koreans continue to eat whale meat, even though
whaling is illegal in Korea? The motivations are cultural.
Whale meat is a delicacy in the southeastern coastal cities of
Korea, especially in Ulsan, Busan, Gyeongju and Pohang.
Unique among these cities, Ulsan is the center of a political
movement to legalize and reinstate whale hunting in deﬁance
of the worldwide moratorium. The municipal government of
Ulsan Namgu [South District] has attempted to promote the
use of whale meat to attract tourists and business develop-
ment. Ulsan is also the city with the highest concentration of
whale meat specialty restaurants. As a recognized center of
culinary activism and political support for whaling, Ulsan
was chosen for this research as the source of discourses about
the cultural value of whale meat Fig. 1.
Bycatch in Korea must be studied as a socio-cultural and
socio-economic problem which stands in the way of whaleconservation management in Korea. What is important for
conservation policy is not whose conception of bycatch is ‘‘cor-
rect,’’ but the social context in which these cultural models
acquire descriptive power. In South Korea, this context is
characterized by three important social phenomena: mobilized
stakeholders taking action to defend the use of whale meat in a
culinary subculture; the intervention of local government to
promote whale meat as a symbol of cultural heritage; and
the existence of a consumer-driven market for whale meat.
The research method undertaken here is to uncover the social
functions of the cultural models utilized by actors in this social
context.
Materials and methods
The research was carried out through interviews and direct
observation. Interviews were carried out with public ofﬁcials
of the Bureau of Whale Tourism of Ulsan Namgu Kang
Jun-hee and Suh Jae-in, who provided valuable assistance. In
addition, the author is grateful to Lee Man-woo and Go
Jeong-goo of the Whale Culture Preservation Association
[WCPA] for generously allowing numerous interviews and
patiently explaining their views about the future of whales
and ‘‘whale culture’’ in Ulsan. I am also grateful to Park
Seon-goo, Director of the Ulsan Whale Museum, and I am
especially grateful to An Du Hae, Director of the Cetacean
Research Institute [CRI] of the National Fisheries Research
and Development Institute.
Direct observation was carried out by the author at staged
public events in the city of Ulsan. I attended the Ulsan Whale
Festival four times (2010–2013) and observed how whale meat
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two occasions I attended the unveiling and dedication of new
facilities in the Special Zone for Whale Culture. In these public
ceremonies I was able to observe the behaviors of Ulsan citi-
zens and to engage some of them in conversations. Members
of the public were able to observe me, too, and I was ques-
tioned about my own beliefs regarding whales and whaling.
These conversations and observations were recorded in my
ﬁeld notes, from which I have compiled data on the four differ-
ent reactions to the moratorium.
Presenting the case of Ulsan in Korea, I argue that the mor-
atorium on commercial whaling can only succeed in protecting
whales if the policy will be adapted to the local culture. In
Ulsan, opposition to the moratorium on commercial whaling
is guided by a set of popular beliefs:
[1] Eating whale meat is not harmful to the environment.
[2] As a result of the moratorium, whales have multiplied
and are now abundant.
[3] The high rate of minke whale bycatch is proof that the
whales are now abundant.
[4] Whales are eating the ﬁsh that humans need as food. We
must selectively kill whales to control the population
and control their ﬁsh consumption.
In this investigation, I have focused on #1, the belief under-
lying the consumption of whale meat, primarily dealing with
the notions held by whale meat consumers, retailers and activ-
ists. This research did not include ﬁeldwork among ﬁshermen,
and I will not address 2, 3, and 4, which are beliefs prevalent in
Korean ﬁshing communities discovered by MacMillan and
Han (2011).
Theory: social acceptability of policies and environmental
governance
In the debate about the use of cetacean bycatch as a source of
meat, there are two perspectives. First, conservation biologists
and environmental activists advocate for a technical and scien-
tiﬁc solution. They argue for ‘‘increased oversight and control
by the governments of Korea and Japan,’’ which can be
achieved if improvements are made in the procedures for
detecting illegally sourced whale meat and with increased accu-
racy of reporting (Lukoschek et al., 2009; Baker et al., 2006).
The conservation scientists advocate for the use of DNA sam-
pling to monitor markets and cross-check government claims
or accounts of illegal wildlife trade. These assertions reﬂect
the assumption that better methods for detection of illegal
wildlife trade will lead to improvements in enforcement. How-
ever, it can also be argued that enforcement of wildlife conser-
vation is not a technical issue, but a social and political one.
From a social scientiﬁc perspective, technical improvements
in enforcement are not adequate to overcome the problems of
wildlife exploitation (Wilshusen et al., 2002). The problem
should be understood as a failure of social institutions to
establish rules to guide the members of the society toward a
desirable conservation outcome (Acheson, 2006). Social scien-
tists advocate the improvement of ‘‘governance,’’ which is the
design of social institutions for management of wildlife and to
control the drivers of human resource use (Lejano et al., 2007;
Ostrom, 2008; Swidesrska et al., 2008; Young et al., 2007).From this perspective, the policies for conservation of wildlife
and biodiversity are most likely to be successful when the pol-
icies achieve social acceptability. Following Thomassin et al.
(2010, p. 170), social acceptability can be deﬁned as a
‘‘measure of support for a set of regulations, management
tools or towards an organization by an individual or a group
of individuals based on geographic, social, economic and/or
cultural criteria.’’
The most important ﬁrst step toward achieving social
acceptability for a conservation intervention is to carry out a
social impact assessment [SIA]. The SIA ‘‘includes the pro-
cesses of analyzing, monitoring and managing the intended
and unintended social consequences, both positive and nega-
tive, of planned interventions’’ (Vanclay, 2003). To succeed,
an intervention in social-ecological systems requires building
the capacity of regulatory institutions as well as an effective
system of monitoring (Ostrom, 2008; Young et al., 2007).
Creating strategies for capacity building and monitoring
requires conducting an SIA prior to the implementation phase
of the policy.
The IWC moratorium is easily implemented in countries
where whales are not used as food, but its implementation in
Japan or Korea raises special challenges. In Korea, the mora-
torium on commercial whaling was imposed without conduct-
ing an SIA. It is hardly surprising that unintended social
consequences have developed, including a market for illegally
hunted whale meat. Given that millions of people in Korea
have cultural beliefs about the value of eating whale meat,
how can it be possible to convince them to cooperate with
the moratorium on commercial whaling? This is the enormous
challenge that must be undertaken by a systematic SIA in the
future. In spite of the need for a more complete analysis to be
carried out by a team of experts, I begin the initial task with
the following cultural analysis of whale meat consumers in
the city of Ulsan.
Results
Local reactions to the moratorium
In the seaside neighborhood of Jangsaengpo, located in Nam-
gu [South District] in the city of Ulsan, whale meat has been an
important tradition ever since the early 1900s when Russian
and Japanese whalers based their whaling activities here (Ii,
2013; Watanabe 2009). After the conclusion of the Korean
War, Jangsaengpo residents set up their own whaling opera-
tions and supplied whale meat as a cheap and plentiful source
of meat. By the 1970s, Jangsaengpo whalers were exporting the
meat to Japan to realize higher proﬁts (Ii, 2013). As the pros-
perity brought by whaling spread to all members of the local
community, locals exclaimed happily that ‘‘even stray dogs
in the street have ten thousand won bills in their mouths.’’
Hence, the cessation of whaling in 1986 seemed unfair and
intolerable to the Jangsaengpo citizens. There was evidence
that whale stocks were in decline, but the Korean government
made no effort to convince the people that compliance with the
moratorium would be in their best interests. The law was sim-
ply implemented and enforced. The Korean government was
preparing for the 1988 Olympiad in Seoul, and compliance
with the global moratorium was seen as necessary to avoid
bad publicity. In fact, the Korean government was already
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viewed during the Olympics by the international community
(Derr, 2004). The Korean government implemented the global
moratorium on commercial whaling, without carrying out an
SIA, and without giving recognition to the whaling culture
of Ulsan residents.
However, by 1995, Jangsaengpo residents mobilized in
defense of their culture by organizing a new event, the Ulsan
Whale Festival. The purpose of the festival was to keep the
local culture alive, by portraying whale meat as an important
cuisine, and allowing members of the public to taste whale
meat directly. The festival was also created to expose the mem-
bers of the public to the cultural history of whaling. This moti-
vated the festival organizers to combine the whale meat cuisine
with a more holistic and totalized portrayal of the culture of
whaling. In the words of one of the original organizers of
the festival, ‘‘Eating whale meat is essential, but by itself it is
a limited thing, so we need to have a holistic and comprehen-
sive performance culture. . .like in Taiji in Japan, where they
use drumming when they perform whale culture.’’ (Lee
Man-woo, Vice-president of Whale Culture Preservation
Association, personal communication, 9 September 2011).
Nevertheless, in contrast with Japan where some communi-
ties that have practiced whaling for hundreds of years continue
to maintain spiritual and religious bonds with whales (Kato,
2007), the public celebration of whale meat as Ulsan’s tradi-
tion is a recent phenomenon. Hence, the initiation of the Ulsan
Whale Festival marked the emergence of a mobilized cadre of
cultural promoters who sought to continue the consumption of
whale meat under the banner of ‘‘tradition.’’ However, it
marked the emergence of a totally new social practice, which
is the public presentation of whale meat as a marker of collec-
tive identity and tradition. The Ulsan Whale Festival is the
occasion for numerous ceremonies and spectacles in which
the tasting of whale meat is a central event. In other words,
whale meat became not only a food valued for its own sake,
but it became a symbol of an endangered culture, threatened
by the moratorium.
Indispensible to this newly emergent social practice was the
availability of whale meat from bycatch. Jangsaengpo people
regard the whale meat from bycatch as inferior, tasting less
fresh and less ﬂavorful than the meat derived from whaling.
However, the moratorium had left them little choice other than
bycatch. According to the Director of the Ulsan Whale
Museum, ‘‘The whale food culture is maintained through the
meat obtained from the whales that were accidentally caught
in nets. For the whale festival, the restaurants provide whale
meat for those people who want to try the food or those people
who miss the whale meat’’ (Park Seon-goo, Director of Ulsan
Whale Museum, personal communication, 11 April 2013).
Hence, the meat taken from cetacean bycatch allows people
to experience the memories of Ulsan’s past society and culture.
In this respect, whale meat from bycatch serves two important
public functions. First, it makes it possible to portray a collec-
tive heritage of the city, which represents the past history and
roots of all Ulsan citizens. Second, it also functions to allow
the survival of a local culture which is viewed as threatened
by the moratorium on commercial whaling. However, this
public culture which represents whale meat as something crit-
ical and necessary for community identity also gives a positive
image to the private, individualized consumption of whale
meat in restaurants and private residences. In other words,the public culture of whale meat helps to legitimize the private
consumption. This produces a market for whale meat with
demand that far exceeds the amount that can be procured
through bycatch. As a result, illegal whaling is a proﬁtable
activity in the context of a culture in which the consumption
of whale meat continues to be socially accepted by a sizable
public.
Utilized as a symbol of an endangered culture, whale meat
in Ulsan today is not merely a continuation of a time-hallowed
tradition. Rather, the consumption of whale meat derived
from bycatch in Ulsan today is a new social practice, recently
concocted for the purpose of representing and experiencing the
past as a collective heritage. The culture of whale meat con-
sumption in Ulsan today can best be understood as a reaction
to the moratorium, rather than a static or unchanging
tradition. In Ulsan, the responses to the moratorium are
diverse and heterogeneous, but can be grouped as signifying
only four different postures toward the commercial
moratorium on whaling. I have documented and classiﬁed four
reactions to the moratorium: opposition, resistance, evasion,
and support.
Opposition implies organized political action, attempting to
overturn anti-whaling laws and directives at the national as
well as the international levels. Resistance means breaking
the law, and continuing to carry out whaling for commercial
purposes. Evasion is the stance of complying with the morato-
rium and avoiding a pro-whaling posture, while continuing to
eat whale meat. Finally, support for the moratorium means
supporting anti-whaling laws and avoiding all consumption
of illegal whale meat. In the following, I describe the four reac-
tions of opposition, resistance, evasion and support.
Opposition
Why do many people in Ulsan refuse to accept the need for the
global moratorium on commercial whaling? One important
argument is that whales must be eaten for the survival of the
local culture. This has been argued may times, such as in news-
paper editorials (Choe, 2008; Lee, 2012). Mr. Go Jung-goo,
director of a local pro-whaling citizen’s group known as the
Whale Culture Protection Association [WCPA] explained,
‘‘The Inuit in Alaska are not the only ones who must eat whale
for survival; we the people here in Jangsaengpo also need
whaling for our survival’’ (Go Jung-goo, personal communica-
tion, 11 April 2013).
This indicates that Ulsan’s local whaling advocates see
themselves as candidates for ‘‘aboriginal subsistence whaling,’’
which permits whaling for the purpose of cultural survival
(Hamaguchi, 2013). They disagree with environmentalists’
argument that Native Americans in the U.S., Inuit and First
Nations of Canada have authentic cultural rights to hunt
whales, whereas Koreans or Japanese do not (Scheiber,
1998). The Ulsan pro-whaling activists directly oppose this
idea. From their perspective, bycatch is merely a second best
option, but it is absolutely necessary for cultural survival in
the era of the moratorium.
The Koreans who want to continue whaling perceive the
issue as one of social justice. From its base in Jangsaengpo,
the WCPA has participated in organized efforts to overturn
the moratorium on whaling. In 2009, the organization helped
to collect over 20,000 signatures from Ulsan citizens to
demand the right to reinstate whaling (Jung, 2009). The
Fig. 2 A plate of whale meat as traditionally served by
restaurants in Jangsaengpo, Ulsan. The meat is served raw or
parboiled and accompanied by dipping sauces. The meats are not
seasoned, except for the marinated raw meat served with pear
slices in the center.
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District Mayor of Ulsan Namgu. These and other political
actions reﬂect the local perception that the moratorium on
whaling violates the local rights of Ulsan citizens.
Resistance
Resistance to the moratorium on commercial whaling is any
effort to continue using whale meat from whales hunted ille-
gally. A major source of resistance comes from restaurant
owners and others who sell whale meat to consumers. These
stakeholders complain that law enforcement is making whale
meat scarce. For example, one restaurant owner pointed out,
‘‘There are about 100 whales caught legally as bycatch each
year, but at least 300 are consumed nationwide’’ (Lee, 2011).
Hence, these entrepreneurs believe that they have no choice
other than to buy whale meat from illegal catch
(Kyeongsang Ilbo, 2011).
One whale meat restaurant owner remarked tersely, ‘‘No
matter how expensive it gets, people keep coming here to eat
it’’ (Mr. K., personal communication, 28 January 2011). This
is not merely a justiﬁcation of the desire to proﬁt from selling
meat from an endangered species, but indicates a deeper
understanding of the forces of supply and demand. The restau-
rant owner is saying that conservation and enforcement mea-
sures will not be able to prevent the market from supplying
the consumer, as long as there is vigorous demand for the
product. Hence, the restaurant owner understands the market
for whale meat as a consumer-driven phenomenon, not as sup-
ply-driven.
The idea that the market for whale meat is consumer-driven
rather than supply-driven has major consequences for conser-
vation policies in Korea, because the policies target only the
sources of illegal whale meat rather than consumers (Tatar
and Lee, 2012). For example, Macmillan and Han (2011)
found that scarcities caused by enforcement efforts led to
higher prices and stimulated demand, which led to intensiﬁca-
tion of illegal whaling. The restaurant owner quoted above
also stated, ‘‘I never want to speak to journalists because when
I do, other people read in the newspapers that the price of
whale meat is high and they open their own restaurants’’
(Mr. K., personal communication, 28 January 2011).
In fact, there is some evidence that whale meat restaurants
are increasing in number in Korea. For example, searching the
Internet in 2011, I found listings (with addresses and phone
numbers) for a total of 156 whale meat specialty shops. Out
of this total, 69 were listed in Ulsan, 19 in Pohang, and 25 in
Busan. However, there were also 29 whale meat specialists in
Seoul and Kyunggi Province, outside of the region where
whale meat is traditionally consumed. Critics also point out
that whale is served in non-specialty establishments as well,
such as regular sushi restaurants (Kang, 2010). I was also able
to ﬁnd minke whale meat sold for home delivery on two of
Korea’s popular Internet shopping sites.
It is also important to mention that the Ulsan Namgu
Bureau of Whale Tourism is promoting whale meat as an
option for tourists who want to discover the delicacy. Ulsan
Namgu has commissioned a professor of culinary arts to
develop new recipes which do not have the characteristically
strong smell of whale meat (Kwak, 2011), enabling young con-
sumers to try whale meat for the ﬁrst time. This is a majordeparture from the whale meat prepared in the traditional rec-
ipes of Jangsaengpo, as described by Ii (2013). A restaurant
owner in Jangsaengpo remarked, ‘‘I don’t want to sell the
new ‘Whale’s Table,’ because it is too difﬁcult for us to provide
both the old menu and the new menu for customers. Already
it’s difﬁcult to procure whale meat, and the new menu requires
us to procure many other things.’’ (Mr. C., personal communi-
cation, 27 April 2012). Nevertheless, Ulsan Namgu publishes
brochures for visitors to Ulsan which include a list of restau-
rants which serve the ‘‘Whale’s Table’’ (Figs. 2–5).
It is difﬁcult to understand why Ulsan Namgu is trying to
recruit new consumers with non-traditional recipes, given that
the supply of legally sourced whale meat from bycatch is very
limited. An ofﬁcial of Ulsan Namgu responded to the ques-
tion, ‘‘Since the supply is limited it cannot sustain the large
number of restaurants. That means that through the natural
action of the market, many restaurants will be forced out of
business and only the leading ones will remain, allowing the
supply and demand to meet equilibrium once again’’ (Suh
Jae-in, personal communication, 24 August 2011). This seems
to imply that only the restaurants capable of providing the
‘‘Whale’s Table’ menu promoted by Ulsan Namgu will remain
in business. The intervention by Ulsan Namgu seems to be
aimed at maximizing proﬁts for a few whale meat retailers.
Hence, Ulsan Namgu’s goal is very distant from the local com-
munity goal of using bycatch as a food source for the survival
of Jangsaengpo’s distinctive culture.
Evasion
One important fact about whale meat in Ulsan is that many
who eat it do not in fact oppose the moratorium. These con-
sumers claim that eating whale meat is harmless, as long as
the animal was not intentionally hunted but died through acci-
dental entanglement. I refer to this as the ‘‘safety of bycatch’’
claim. Behind this claim is the belief that cetacean bycatch is
not preventable, so using it as a source of food does not hurt
whale populations nor bring harm to the environment. This
stance allows a person to swear compliance with the
Fig. 3 A menu of "traditional" dishes typical of Ulsan whale
meat. The boiled and raw servings of sliced meat are listed on the
left side. In addition, this restaurant serves gorae chiggae (whale
stew) and gorae duruchigi (whale stir fry in chili sauce).
Fig. 4 A bowl of whale meat dumpling soup. This non-
traditional dish was displayed at the Ulsan Whale Festival in 2012.
Fig. 5 At the 2012 Ulsan Whale Festival, members of the public
viewed the new menu items.
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bycatch’’ claim functions as basic knowledge for many
consumers of whale meat in Ulsan.
The importance of this belief was ﬁrst brought to my atten-
tion by a member of the audience at the 5th annual Korean/
Japanese Whale Meat Cooking Competition, an event held
annually in Jangsaengpo from 2007 to 2011. As the dishes were
served, an older man in the audience approached me and
explained, ‘‘These whales that we eat were not hunted. They
are caught in the ﬁsher’s net by accident. Whaling is illegal
in Korea.’’
The same posture toward whaling was revealed in a nation-
wide survey carried out in Korea in 2009 by Greenpeace and
KFEM (KFEM, 2009). The survey reported that 67.9% of
respondents opposed whaling, while only 16.7% supported
commercial whaling. Nevertheless, the same survey reports
that 58% of respondents answered in favor of using bycatch
as a source of whale meat if the whale is already dead when
encountered by the ﬁsherman.Another example suggests the difference between consum-
ing bycatch and consuming hunted whales is taken seriously
in Ulsan. A commercially released ﬁlm called ‘‘The Bicycle
Looking for a Whale’’ was produced by Ulsan Namgu. It is
a ﬁctional story of a fugitive from the law who was unjustly
accused of whaling. When two children learned of his past
and confronted him, the man defended himself by saying, ‘‘I
never killed a living whale. . .I only butchered whales that were
found already dead. To butcher a dead whale is not nearly as
cruel as to kill a live whale’’ (English subtitles, Bicycle Looking
for a Whale, 2011).
The anti-whaling activists claim that these beliefs are not a
genuine part of Korean culture, but are calculated justiﬁca-
tions for eating whales and for seeking the resumption of whal-
ing (Kim 2011). However, it is signiﬁcant that many whale
meat consumers in Korea do not openly assert opposition to
the moratorium but actually assert their support for it. This
contrasts with Japan, where opposition to the moratorium is
openly expressed (Blok, 2008; Bowett and Hay, 2009). In the
social context of Ulsan, the ‘‘safety of bycatch’’ concept
provides a genuine perception of legitimacy to the practice of
eating whale meat in restaurants.
Support
Although whaling is a tradition in Ulsan, there are residents of
the city who oppose whaling and support the moratorium on
commercial whaling. This viewpoint is most strongly expressed
by the members of the KFEM. They argue that, ‘‘Whale meat
is neither a necessity nor a traditional food. It does not make
sense that animals that are on the verge of extinction are
caught because of a minority of epicures’’ (Limb, 2005). In
their view, the cultural practice of eating whale meat is merely
an invention and is not a genuine part of Korean culture.
There are three major points argued by the environmental-
ists. First, they argue that Ulsan Namgu utilizes the Ulsan
Whale Festival to promote the consumption of whale meat,
motivated by proﬁts reaped by whale meat vendors (Oh,
2008, 2011). By combining the information about whale
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serves to confuse citizens who may not understand the endan-
gered status of the whales (Choi, 2010). In addition, the envi-
ronmentalists argue that the number of whale meat restaurants
in Korea is increasing rapidly, and that this is an indicator of
augmented consumer demand (Kim, 2011; Limb, 2005; Oh,
2011). This argument implies that the whale meat market is
largely supplied by meat from illegal whaling. The argument
contrasts directly with the anti-whaling activists’ portrayal of
Japan, where they claim that demand for whale meat is precip-
itously declining (Clapham et al., 2007).
Finally, the third argument is that eating whale meat from
bycatch is not safe, because bycatch is a disguised form of
directed whaling. A British collaborator with KFEM
explained, ‘‘The Koreans make a big song and dance about
how they don’t harpoon whales, but you don’t need a harpoon
to kill a whale. It is very easy to drown a whale in your net’’
(Demick, 2005). Furthermore, the fact that there is a market
for whale meat means there is no incentive for a ﬁsher to free
a whale that has become entangled.
KFEM has led protests against whaling on the streets of
Ulsan and Seoul, and has also participated in scientiﬁc
research to identify meat from illegal whaling that is sold in
the markets and restaurants (Baker et al., 2010). Through sem-
inars and public events, KFEM has tried to disseminate the
scientiﬁc evidence in support of the hypothesis that whale meat
consumption is extremely harmful to whale populations and
their chances of survival (Lee, 2009). However, the scientiﬁc
evidence is based on DNA forensics, with the result that the
average member of the public has difﬁculty understanding
the evidence. While interviewing citizens at the Ulsan Whale
Festival, the author has met some who agree that whales are
endangered; however, not one of these persons was able to
mention the scientiﬁc evidence in support of her or his view-
point. This opacity of DNA science for members of the general
public illustrates the difﬁculty of gaining converts to anti-
whaling in Ulsan on the strength of scientiﬁc evidence.Conclusion and recommendation for future policy
The policy I focused on is the global moratorium on commer-
cial whaling, a policy with worldwide reach; I have examined
how local stakeholders react to the moratorium in Ulsan.
Presenting the reactions of urban consumers as well as retailers
of whale meat, I have tried to demonstrate that attitudes
toward whale meat are not simply based upon ideas about
whales or whaling. Rather, the stakeholders’ attitudes about
whale meat also reﬂect their knowledge of the policy itself,
including their understandings of how the policy operates,
how it fails or succeeds in achieving its goals, and how it
impacts the local society. I have categorized these discourses
to provide a knowledge inventory of the local stakeholders.
The management of social-ecological systems requires
stakeholder involvement which is critical to the tasks of build-
ing institutional capacity for monitoring and enforcement
(Ostrom, 2008; Young et al., 2007). How can we draw upon
the Korean stakeholders’ knowledge to outline a direction
for more successful whale conservation policy?
First, to involve the local stakeholders it is absolutely nec-
essary to gain their trust. This requires showing respect toward
the local culture of whale meat consumers. The local whalemeat constituency must not be derided as ‘‘a minority of epi-
cures,’’ or else as practitioners of a ‘‘primitive’’ custom. The
fact that a large constituency continues to view whale meat
consumption as legitimate suggests that whale conservation
will not be achievable without the constituency’s collaboration
and cooperation. Every effort should be made to secure the
trust and support of whale meat consumers for the commercial
moratorium on whaling, even if this seems to be an insur-
mountable task. The task begins by showing respect for their
culture.
Second, it is important to ﬁnd points of commonality
between the opposed points of view. The environmentalists
and the pro-whaling constituents alike have indicated their
belief that the market is driven by demand for whale meat.
The current whale conservation policy in Korea focuses on
supply, by restricting the legal source of whale meat to
bycatch, and using law enforcement in the attempt to eradicate
illegal whaling. However, if the stakeholders view the market
as demand driven, this suggests that a radical new approach
to whale conservation is necessary. However, such a policy
cannot succeed unless demand is also decreased through
restrictions on consumption as well. In other words, control,
monitoring and enforcement must be extended to consumer
practices as well as to combat whaling.
Hence, it is important to extend government control to the
retail sale and consumption of whale meat as well. DNA
forensic technology should be applied to prevent meat
originating from illegal sources from being sold in the market,
utilizing the methods demonstrated by Baker et al. (2010).
However, restricting the type of whale meat sold according
to its source may not be adequate for protecting endangered
populations.
In addition, there must be restrictions on where whale meat
can be sold, and by whom. Currently, minke whale meat is
available for home delivery in Korea if ordered on the Internet.
Furthermore, whale meat restaurants are becoming more com-
mon in Seoul and elsewhere outside of the traditional area on
the southeastern coastline of Korea. Much of this consump-
tion is not for cultural or traditional needs, but merely to sat-
isfy the curious palate. In order to reduce demand, the Korean
government should limit consumption to traditional events
(Ulsan Whale Festival) and locations (Jangsaengpo waterfront
restaurants).
How can the whale meat constituents be convinced to coop-
erate with a system of retail monitoring and enforcement?
Borrowing from Ostrom (2008), I suggest creating a unique
set of entitlements for a select set of merchants and advocates
of whale meat. Whale meat commerce should be open only to
those who have a proven cultural and historical connection to
whale meat. This type of control can be carried out through
the issuance of a limited number of retail licenses, such as
the license system used in Japan to control retailers of tuna
(Bestor, 2004). Such a licensing system would help to limit
the volume of whale meat traded, while also facilitating mon-
itoring and control by the authorities; at the same time, it
would safeguard the cultural rights of those Koreans who view
whale meat as an essential part of their cultural identity.
In Ulsan, Korea, and other contexts where eating whale
meat is viewed as a social justice issue, the environmentalists’
preferred solution of outlawing whale meat consumption is
not feasible, as illustrated by local reactions to the moratorium
on commercial whaling. A more optimal strategy to mitigate
96 B. Tatarhuman predation on whales is to design interventions which
are compatible with the existing cultural models of whales
and whaling. Future policies should be designed after a com-
plete analysis and extensive consultation with local community
members, as well as with marine biologists, law enforcement
agents, whale meat retailers and other stakeholders.
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